#### REMARKS/ARGUMENTS

The Office Action has been carefully considered. In the Office Action, claims were rejected in the following manner.

- Claims 25-26 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by England et al's US Patent No. 6.775.779 B1 (hereinafter "England").
- Claims 27-28 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over England.
- Claims 1-24 and 29-33 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over England in view of Graunke et al's US Patent No. 5,991,399 (hereinafter "Graunke").

### 35 U.S.C. § 102 (e) Rejections

Claims 25-26 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by *England*. For at least the reasons discussed below, Applicants respectfully submit that *England* fails to disclose every element of Claims 25-26.

Claim 25 recites in pertinent part as follows:

verifying with a root one of a plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules, that each module that occupies an immediate downstream position in the hierarchy of modules from the root module has not been compromised, during an initialization period:

exclusively receiving with the root one of the plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules a first digital content of a first type; rendering in part with said root one of said modules said first digital content:

re-verifying with said root one of said modules that one of the at least one other one of the modules occupying an immediate downstream position in the hierarchy of modules from the root module is uncompromised; and

transferring with said root one of said modules the first digital content to the re-verified immediate downstream module to further the rendering of the first digital content.

Thus, Claim 25 claims a series of operations (verifying... exclusively receiving... rendering in part... and transferring), all of which are performed with a root one of a plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules.

England is directed towards protecting premium content in a nonsecure computer environment using modules arranged in a hierarchy of trust. Abstract. Thus, England and Claim 25 may be generally directed towards achieving similar goals. Indeed, they each speak of a "root" of a hierarchy of modules. However, as discussed below. England does not disclose a

"root one of a plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules" that performs the specific operations claimed in Claim 25. Thus, *England* does not identically disclose each and every element of Claim 25, and Applicants respectfully submit that the Office Action has failed to state a *prima facie* case that Claim 25 is anticipated.

## England does not disclose a root one of a plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules that performs the operations claimed in Claim 25.

In the Office Action at 6-7, 10, et al., England's Numeral 441 in Fig. 4 is interpreted to be the root one of the... digital content rendering modules. Numeral 441 in Fig. 4 refers to a secure DLL used by a content provider application to store a list of other modules. E.g. Col. 8 lines 16-17; Col. 11 lines 10-13. Numeral 441 in Fig. 4 can confer trust upon the other modules listed therein. Col. 11 lines 25-30.

However, Numeral 441 in Fig. 4 is not a "root one of a plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules," as claimed. On the contrary, England specifically states, "the root of trust of secure code modules is a secure loader 410.... Trust descends hierarchically to one or more security managers 420...." Col. 7 line 66-Col. 8 line 3. Security manager 420 further passes trust to Numeral 441 in Fig. 4. Col. 8 lines 25-26. Thus, Numeral 441 in Fig. 4 is at most a middle node in a hierarchy of trust having Secure Loader 410 as its root.

# England does not disclose "verifying with a root one of a plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules, that each Jimmediate downstream module] has not been compromised, during an initialization period."

Moreover, the Office Action at 3 and 10 states that the claimed "verifying" step is disclosed by England at Col. 11 lines 9-14. However, that portion of England discloses that "[a]nother function of security manager 420 is to offer several types of cryptographic services to the [content provider] modules. .... Upon initial load--or later--the [security manager 420] identifies the trusted modules..." (emphasis added, abbreviations spelled out). Thus, England does not support the Office Action's assertion that Numeral 441 in Fig. 4 "verifies... that each [immediate downstream module] has not been compromised, during an initialization period," as claimed.

At most, England discloses that a security manager identifies trusted modules upon initial load or later. However, England never discloses that security manager 420 is capable of performing any of the other operations (i.e., exclusively receiving, rendering in part, re-verifying, transferring) that are performed by Claim 25's "root one of... digital content rendering modules."

12

Thus, even according to the Office Action's own interpretation, *England* does not disclose "verifying with a root one of a plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules, that each [immediate downstream module] has not been compromised, during an initialization period," as claimed.

# <u>England</u> does not disclose "verifying with a root one of a plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules... [and] re-verifying with said root one of said modules..."

In addition, Applicants respectfully submit that *England* teaches a substantive difference between "identifying" a trusted module and "verifying" a trusted module, and that the Office Action errantly relies on *England's* teachings related to "identification" when Claim 25 is directed to "verification" and then "re-verification."

As disclosed at Co. 11 lines 9-14, trusted modules may be "identified" by reading a list of public keys from a content provider secure DLL either upon initial load or later. However, England teaches that actual "verification" of the trusted modules occurs only once. Applicants respectfully point out England's discussion of blocks 540 in Figure 5 at Col. 14 lines 35-45.

Blocks 540 show the operation of hierarchical trust during operation of system 120 after the security manager is in place. .... If [an untrusted] module calls a trusted module, block 542 starts trusted interrupt handler 422.... If the security manager names the called module as trusted, block 543 causes block 544 to verify that its signature is correct i.e., that it is the module it claims to be.

Thus, England discloses that a module may be identified as trusted at initialization or later, but that the module's identity must be verified one time when the module is called (i.e., only when the module is called must it be "verified" to ensure that the module actually is the module it has been identified as). England never discloses that a module is "re-verified," let alone "re-verifying with said root one of said modules that one of the [downstream modules] is uncompromised; and transferring with said root one of said modules the first digital content to the re-verified immediate downstream module to further the rendering of the first digital content." as claimed.

This conclusion is supported by England's published claims 38-40 and 43-44, which disclose a module identification step ("determining that the second module is a trusted module") and a single module verification step ("verifying a signature of the second module") with no additional re-verification step.

For this additional reasons, Applicants respectfully submit that *England* does not disclose each element of Claim 25.

<u>England</u> does not disclose "exclusively receiving with the root one of the plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules a first digital content of a first type."

Moreover, England does not disclose a root one of a plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules to "exclusively receiv[e]... a first digital content of a first type," as claimed. Once again, the Office Action asserts that Numeral 441 in Fig. 4 discloses this element, citing to Col. 11 lines 6-31. However, as discussed above, that portion of England discusses Numeral 441 in Fig. 4 only peripherally. Therefore, it does not support the Office Action's assertion.

In addition, neither the cited section, nor any other section of England discloses a root one digital content rendering module exclusively receiving digital content of a first type, as claimed. On the contrary, the cited portion of England discloses at most that a content provider application may exclusively decrypt a secret key or other data encrypted by a content provider.

Col. 11 lines 19-22. Alternatively, content provider application may exclusively receive a key or other secret data by decrypting a digest with a key provided by security manager 420. Col. 11 lines 25-28.

Indeed, England teaches almost the exact opposite. At Col. 8 lines 54-58, England discloses that "Anyone can write an application that chooses not to use the secure path to device driver 460. Any content played can be easily picked off by pirate code in the audio stack." Because England teaches that any content can be received by any module, England must further disclose various methods to encrypt content with secret keys. Thus, according to England, any module can receive a digital content of a first type, but only certain modules can obtain secret keys to decrypt encrypted content. See generally Cols 9-10.

Thus, Applicants respectfully submit that England does not disclose "exclusively receiving with the root one of the plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules a first digital content of a first type," as claimed in Claim 25.

<u>England</u> does not disclose "rendering in part... re-verifying... and transferring with said root one of said modules the first digital content to the re-verified immediate downstream module."

The Office Action, asserts that England discloses rendering in part a first digital content with a root one of the plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules, reverifying a downstream module with the root module, and transferring the first digital content to the re-verified downstream module, as claimed. The Office Action, at 3 and 10, relies on Col. 11

lines 9-14 to support this assertion. In particular, the Office Action's support for its assertion comes from England's teaching that "Upon initial load—or later—the [security manager 420] identifies the trusted modules, so that a call to them maps their pages." According to the Office Action's interpretation, set out on page 3, this statement means that two separate verification steps are performed by the security manager: once during initial load and "once the audio content is downloaded SM once again verify a downstream module[]."

However, Applicants respectfully submit that neither the cited portions of England, nor any other portion of England, support the proposition for which they are cited. The first paragraph of Col. 11 discloses that a content provider application may name other modules that it trusts by naming a public key of the trusted modules in secure DLL (Numeral 441 in Fig. 4). England teaches that the security manager 420 identifies the named modules either upon initial load or at a later time. England simply does not teach that security manager 420 identifies the named modules on two separate occasions, as asserted in the Office Action. Thus, the Office Action relies on an unsupported assertion that security manager 420 identifies trusted modules at initial load and once again verifies once audio content is loaded.

Moreover, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Office Action's assertion was supported, England nonetheless would not disclose rendering in part a first digital content with a root one of the plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules, reverifying a downstream module with the root module, and transferring the first digital content to the re-verified downstream module, as claimed. As admitted in the Office Action, Col. 11 lines 9-14 describes actions performed by security manager 420. However, according to Claim 25, the claimed steps are performed by a root content rendering module, and the Office Action, at pages 6-7 and 10, interprets Numeral 441 in Fig. 4, not security manager 420, to be a root digital content rendering module. Thus, even according to the Office Action's own interpretation, England fails to disclose rendering in part and re-verifying by the root one of the plurality of hierarchically organized digital content rendering modules, as claimed.

For at least the reasons discussed above, Applicants respectfully submit that the Office Action's rejection of Claim 25 is deficient. The Office Action's rejection of Claim 26 is similarly deficient according to similar reasoning.

15

### 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) Rejections

### Claims 27-28

Claims 27-28 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over England. Applicants incorporate the above arguments with respect to Claim 25 and further respectfully submit that according to similar reasoning, England does not teach or even suggest every element of Claims 27-28. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully submit that the Office Action has failed to state a prima facie case that Claims 27-28 are obvious in light of England.

### Claims 1-24 and 29-33

Claims 1-24 and 29-33 were rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over England in view of Graunke. Applicants incorporate the above arguments with respect to Claim 25 and further respectfully submit that according to similar reasoning, England in view of Graunke does not teach or even suggest every element of Claims 1-24 and 29-33. Accordingly, Applicants respectfully submit that the Office Action has failed to state a prima facie case that Claims 1-24 and 29-33 are obvious considering England in view of Graunke.

#### CONCLUSION

For at least the reasons above, Applicants respectfully submit that all pending claims are allowable and request that the Examiner permit these claims to proceed to issuance. Although additional arguments are believed to exist for distinguishing the cited documents, the arguments presented are believed sufficient to address the Examiner's rejections. Likewise, failure of the Applicants to respond to a position taken by the Examiner is not an indication of acceptance or acquiescence of the Examiner's position. Instead, it is believed that the Examiner's positions are rendered moot by the foregoing arguments, and it is therefore not believed necessary to respond to every position taken by the Examiner with which Applicants do not agree.

The Examiner is respectfully requested to contact the undersigned at the telephone number below if there are any remaining questions regarding this application.

We believe the appropriate fees accompany this transmission. If, however, insufficient fee payment or fee overpayment occurs, the amount may be withdrawn or deposited from/to AXIOS Law Group's deposit account. The deposit account number is 50-4051.

Respectfully submitted, AXIOS LAW GROUP

17

Date: March 6, 2009 by: /Adam L.K. Philipp/

Adam L.K. Philipp - Reg. No.: 42,071 Direct: 206.217.2226

E-mail: adam@axioslaw.com

AXIOS Law Group 1525 4th Avenue, Suite 800 Seattle, WA 98101 Telephone: 206-217-2200 Customer No.: 61,857